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Discrimination in the workplace has been part of a larger web
of segregation, exclusion, restriction, and inferior treatment of
minorities and women throughout American society.' In the labor
context, these conditions have produced high unemployment, in-
ferior occupational status, and low income levels for minorities and
women.2 In an attempt to alter these conditions, Congress has re-
peatedly enacted statutes setting out broad policies favoring equal
opportunity in employment and granting individuals the right to sue
in federal court.3 Individual and institutional litigants have likewise
invoked constitutional principles in the quest for equality in the
workplace.' In short, as Justice Powell noted in Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., "national labor policy embodies the principles of
non-discrimination as a matter of highest priority. . . ."' Despite this
official policy of non-discrimination, the ratio of blacks unemployed
in 1978 to similarly unemployed whites was even higher than in
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); G. MYR-
DAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
2. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY REPORT-1975, JOB PATTERNS FOR WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY (1977);
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR
MINORITIES AND WOMEN (1978).
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1976); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976);
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); Vocational Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (VRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976). In addition, several of the Reconstruction
statutes are frequently utilized in employment discrimination cases, most notably, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (irrebut-
table presumption of physical incompetency violates due process). Equal protection
analysis has been less persuasive. See, e.g., NYC Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979).
5. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
Moskowitz: New Opportunities for Unions to Foster Equal Employment Opportuni
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
2 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 15
1962.' One of the reasons for this lack of progress may have been ex-
cessive reliance on litigation to accomplish equal opportunity.
Such an emphasis on litigation has a number of inherent dif-
ficulties. The flood of employment discrimination cases into the
courts has strained the resources of the federal system.' The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),8 which is charged
with the prime responsibility for administering Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, is even less able than the courts to cope with its
workload.9 Perhaps most importantly, many private litigants are
often without the resources to sustain either the complex and
lengthy court proceedings or the extensive discovery involved in
employment discrimination cases.0 These inherent difficulties re-
6. In 1962 the nonwhite unemployment rate was 124% higher than the white
rate. See 110 CONG. REC. 6547 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). In 1978 the black
unemployment rate was 129%/ higher than the white rate. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, MONTHLY REP. 78 (Mar. 1979), cited in United Steel:
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205 n.4 (1979).
7. During fiscal 1979, 5,477 cases were filed under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act in the federal district courts. Analysis of the Workload of the Federal
Courts, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 71 (1979). This total
represented over 40% of the civil rights cases in the federal courts and an
astronomical increase from 1970, when 344 such cases were filed.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1976).
9. The number of charges filed with the EEOC increased from 8,854 in fiscal
year 1966 to 77,000 in fiscal year 1976. Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts
of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of
the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 71 (1977). The accumulation of unresolved cases before
the EEOC has traditionally caused serious delays in the processing of new charges.
There is an estimated backlog of more than 100,000 charges currently pending before
the EEOC. Siegel, Arbitration of EEO Issues: A Positive View, 32d ANNUAL N.Y.U.
CONFERENCE ON LABOR (1979).
10. A reader of the equal employment opportunity reporting services cannot
fail to note the lengthy history of Title VII cases. The pre-trial period may last years.
Once tried, cases are often appealed several times with subsequent hearings before
district courts. See, for example, the history of Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 443 F.
Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1977), a sex discrimination case first filed in 1967. "After more
than 11 years, 387 docket entries here in the trial court, and 3,934 pages of transcripts,
the case is now before the court for an award of attorney fees." Id. at 698.
See also, Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1712 (5th Cir. 1978):
This case presents a striking illustration of the limitations of a
court, and particularly an appellate court in resolving satisfactorily the
complex and difficult issues that are raised in the Title VII context. The
questions before us today have been at once highly technical and disturb-
ingly elusive. They have required an examination of a voluminous and at
times impenetrable record and have necessitated an exceedingly lengthy
opinion. After twelve years in the courts and scores of pages of appellate
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNIONS
quire consideration of alternate possibilities for furthering the na-
tional policy of equal employment opportunity (EEO).
The collective bargaining relationship provides one possible
alternative context which would avoid many of the problems of lit-
igation while serving similar ends. Collective bargaining in its most
general form reduces the employer's unilateral control over the job.
It establishes contract rights and a measure of industrial
democracy. 1 Unions may come to use this bargaining relationship to
advance EEO because of the requirements placed on them by fed-
eral law and because many of the traditional issues which arise in
EEO litigation vitally concern, and sometimes threaten, the tradi-
tional self-interest of unions and their members. As this article will
show, the use of unions' strategic position in collective bargaining to
further equal employment opportunity can provide women and mi-
norities with enforcement tools and remedies which are at least the
equal of those available in federal court while avoiding the disadvan-
tages of litigation. 2
consideration, we still cannot say with confidence that the end of this
struggle is in sight.
Id. at 1761.
One significant delay-producing factor in judicial handling of EEOC cases is the
frequent litigation of procedural questions. Such procedural questions frequently deal
with deferral of EEOC charges, joinder of parties, mootness and related issues. E.g.,
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (deferral of EEOC charges); Berg v. LaCross
Cooler Co., 548 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1977) (mootness); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503
F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (joinder of parties). A vast number of cases have been
litigated regarding the propriety of class actions. E.g., East Texas Motor Freight Sys.
v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (typicality); Harris v. Pan Am. Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24
(N.D. Calif. 1977) (adequacy of representation); Ruhe v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (numerosity).
The dramatic changes that have occurred in EEO law over the past decade
have likewise contributed to the length of such cases. One particularly dramatic
change was the reversal of a long line of cases regarding seniority systems, e.g.,
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) by International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Moreover, the costs of discovery attendant to such prolonged litigation are
often staggering. See, e.g., Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1175
(E.D. Va. 1976) ($50,000 in out-of-pocket expenses to prove liability against one part of
employer's operation in one geographic region).
11. See generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW 474-78 (1977).
12. The emphasis in this article is on union opportunities to advance EEO
because my own experience indicates that most advances in this field stem from union
initiatives. Most of the concepts discussed, however, are equally applicable to employer
initiatives.
1980]
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Reliance upon the union in EEO matters has a number of im-
portant advantages. It enlists the strength of an ongoing organiza-
tion familiar with the detailed realities of the industrial process and
of the employer's personnel policies. As opposed to episodic litiga-
tion, a collective bargaining approach focuses attention on the con-
tinuing and long-term contractual relationship between union and
management and on the grievance and arbitration machinery as a
problem-solving process. Although not without difficulties for ag-
grieved employees, the grievance and arbitration process presents
important advantages over litigation in terms of both speed and
cost." Critically, reliance on the union enhances the ability to imple-
ment, monitor, and internally police detailed and intricate EEO deci-
sions."
Reliance upon unions is not without its dangers and drawbacks.
The interest of minority employees can conflict with the perceived
interest of the majority and sometimes of the entrenched union lead-
ership. There will always be competing demands for bargaining
power. Consequently, many unions have had, at best, a checkered
history in EEO matters.15 Nonetheless, the collective bargaining ap-
proach remains an underused and potentially effective avenue for
change. Removal of discriminatory barriers can improve employ-
ment opportunities for all employees. The posting of notices of job
vacancies," the elimination of non-job-related tests,' and the integra-
tion of previously segregated jobs 8 can improve the condition of ma-
jority as well as minority workers. Moreover, a number of labor or-
ganizations have consistently advocated expansion of transfer rights
13. Blumrosen, Individual Worker-Employer Arbitration Under Title VII,
31st ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 329 (1978).
14. Gould, The Seattle Builders Trades Order: The First Comprehensive
Relief Against Employment Discrimination in the Construction Industry, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 773 (1974).
15. See R. MARSHALL & V. BRIGGS, THE NEGRO AND APPRENTICESHIP (1967); S.
SPERO & A. HARRIS, THE BLACK WORKER (1931); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CHALLENGE AHEAD: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN REFERRAL UNIONS (1976); Marshall, The
Negro in Southern Unions, The Negro and the American Labor Movement (J. Jacob-
son ed., Anchor 1968); Falk, Women and Unions: A Historical View, 1 WOMENS RIGHTS
L. REP. 54 (1973).
16. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel., 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd,
556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
17. Dickerson v. United States Steel, 472 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see
notes 57-62 supra.
18. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Weber,
white, as well as black employees were able to participate in the special training for
craft jobs that was established pursuant to an affirmative action program.
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and the liberalized use of seniority systems." Pressure from female
and minority members should increasingly cause other unions to fol-
low suit.
In addition to these voluntary union efforts a number of forums
have placed greater emphasis on the collective bargaining process
as a way to insure equal employment opportunity. The EEOC has
formally resolved that it will take into account union and employer
"good faith" efforts to eliminate discriminatory practices when mak-
ing its administrative determination whether or not to file a Title
VII action."0 Lower federal courts are increasingly looking to the
parties', and particularly to the union's collective bargaining history
in determining back pay liability in EEO litigation." Thus, there is
at present not only an opportunity but a pragmatic necessity for
unions to further both national labor policy and their own self-in-
terest by using their bargaining strength to achieve equal employ-
ment opportunity.
Efforts by employers and unions to change long-term economic
inequities need not be limited to practices and systems which overtly
violate federal statutes or to the passive avoidance of such viola-
tions. Conditions which antedate the enactment of Title VII,22
whether permitted by virtue of statutory exemptions,23 or because
not subject to a timely administrative change,' may be affirmatively
addressed through private collective bargaining even though litiga-
tion on such issues is foreclosed. The parties may seek to resolve
problems which they may not have created themselves. 5 In addition,
most affirmative action programs include the establishment of goals
and timetables, affirmative recruitment programs, and the revamp-
ing of selection instruments or procedures to eliminate exclusionary
19. See, e.g., Kleiman & Frankel, Seniority Remedies Under Title VIL The
Steel Consent Decree: A Union Perspective, 28th ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 177, 199 (1975).
20. EEOC Resolution to Encourage Voluntary Affirmative Action in Collec-
tive Bargaining, [1980] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 103:304.
21. See, e.g., Social Serv. Union Local 535 v. Santa Clara County, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 684 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Ryder Truck, 555 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir.
1977). See also notes 242-45 infra and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10
(1977).
23. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(bonafide seniority system that perpetuates pre-Act discrimination).
24. United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
25. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
1980]
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effects on particular groups." These matters are appropriately sub-
ject to private collective bargaining.
Bargaining about EEO matters was implicitly endorsed by the
Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber. 7 Weber
resolved many of the legal problems that beset unions seeking to im-
plement privately bargained affirmative action programs.2 8 The deci-
sion provides a clear, positive signal to private parties seeking in
good faith to address the complex problems of discrimination in the
workplace. It places the highest judicial endorsement behind the no-
tion that the parties themselves are often the best-equipped to
design effective solutions to problems of discrimination. Neither the
statutory limits of Title VII nor the equitable restraint of the judiciary
should pose a barrier to voluntary efforts to remedy "traditional
patterns of ... segregation and hierarchy."' As the Supreme Court
emphasized in Weber, the principal purpose of Title VII is to induce
voluntary solutions to problems of discrimination.0 Finally, Weber
establishes that Title VII does not prohibit remedial solutions based
upon race-conscious affirmative action plans.
This article will focus upon new union opportunities to advance
EEO within the structure of collective bargaining and will advocate
the use of such opportunities as one important component of an
overall strategy for achieving employment equality. Union opportu-
nities will be examined first with respect to the statutory obligation
to bargain in good faith." Within this context the union may act by
negotiating contract provisions, 2 grieving and arbitrating EEO
claims based on the contract,' and securing vital information from
the employer.' Union liability under Title VII and the duty of fair
representation3 5 will then be surveyed to demonstrate the existence
26. EEOC-Affirmative Action Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 4,422 (1979) (29 C.F.R.
§ 1608.4). See note 138 infra and accompanying text. As used in this article, "non-
discrimination" refers to the avoidance of practices or policies which violate federal
statutes such as Title VII. "Affirmative action" refers to remedial activity in response
to past discrimination or voluntary action taken to remedy inequities which may, for
various reasons, lie outside the reach of those statutes. As used here, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity is the general theme which underlies both concepts.
27. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
28. See notes 93-108 infra and accompanying text.
29. 443 U.S. at 204.
30. Id.
31. See notes 40-52 infra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 53-81 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 82-90 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 109-91 infra and accompanying text.
35. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See generally note 151
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1980], Art. 1
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of compelling and financial reasons for unions to take advantage of
such collective bargaining opportunities." These potential sources of
litigation and judicial intervention in union activities may also serve
minorities, both within and outside the union, as a technique for ex-
erting pressure on unions to become actively involved in bargaining
over EEO issues and in enforcing EEO programs already won. It
will be urged that courts should explicitly use a union's collective
bargaining history in determining union liability for back pay, as the
EEOC is already doing in determining whether to press litigation
against unions. In this way, union efforts to advance EEO would in-
sulate unions from potentially ruinous back pay claims, providing ad-
ditional positive incentive to unions to bargain over EEO issues.
Such an approach constitutes a necessary and effective combination
of collective bargaining and EEO policies while avoiding the finan-
cial, personal, and social costs of episodic and uncoordinated litiga-
tion. In so doing, the introduction of EEO issues into the bargaining
process should be welcomed by all the relevant parties-the unions,
the employer, and the hitherto excluded minority work force.
UNION OPPORTUNITIES TO FURTHER EEO WITHIN THE
STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Private collective bargaining is the fundamental mode of deal-
ing with workplace problems in the labor relations system in the
United States. This is embodied in the policies underlying the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)"7 which protects employees' right
to "form, join and assist labor organizations"' and promotes labor
peace by "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining... ." To implement these policies, a duty to bargain is placed
upon both employer and union.'" This duty is made more specific by
Section 8(d) of the NLRA which provides that although the parties
are not required to agree to a proposal or to make concessions, they
must meet and confer in "good faith" with respect to "wages, hours,
36. See notes 193-247 infra and accompanying text.
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) (originally enacted as 49 Stat. 449 (1935)).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
40. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- ... (5) to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents . . .(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, pro-
vided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of
section 159(a) ....
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
19801
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and other terms and conditions of employment .. ."" While the par-
ticular matters subject to the duty to bargain in good faith are not
always self-evident, it is firmly established that if a subject is con-
tained within the statutory phrase, it is an unfair labor practice for
either employer or union to refuse to bargain about that subject
upon a request by the other."2 The duty to bargain in good faith ex-
tends to the administration of collective bargaining agreements as
well as to their negotiation" and includes the employer's duty to
provide the union with information the latter needs to bargain effec-
tively."
This section will examine the basis for asserting that equal
employment opportunity has become a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining. To the extent that this is the case, unions have
been given the opportunity to insist on addressing EEO issues in
the bargaining process. Furthermore, as examined in the final por-
tion of this section, they may make attendant demands for informa-
tion in the possession of the employer relating to EEO matters. In
essence, this portion of the argument seeks to demonstrate that
unions have the opportunity to play a substantially enhanced role in
fostering equal employment opportunity. The final section of this ar-
ticle will examine the existing pressures which may encourage
unions to avail themselves of this opportunity, and will suggest ways
in which those pressures may be highlighted and increased.
EEO As A Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has long held that
discrimination in employment is a "term and condition of employ-
ment" within the meaning of Section 8(d) and that its elimination or
41. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the per-
formance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
42. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Inland Steel Co. v.
NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
43. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). See notes 52, 82-90 infra
and accompanying text.
44. See notes 109-91 infra and accompanying text.
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prevention is a mandatory subject of bargaining." Discriminatory
employment practices are contained within the mandatory scope of
collective bargaining, both with respect to overtly discriminatory
practices"' and practices which are neutral on their face but have a
discriminatory impact or effect. 7 This principle has already had far-
reaching effects in certain industries.
NLRB decisions which find that discriminatory practices affect
the terms and conditions of employment applicable to the bargaining
unit are in accord with judicial" and congressional" policy against
discrimination in the workplace. "Indeed, an employer may have no
objection to incorporating into a collective agreement the substance
of his obligation not to discriminate in personnel decisions."5 Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the most important legislative
enactment in the area of equal employment opportunity, was intended
to spur private activity of this sort on the part of employers and of
unions.'
Furthermore, the duty to bargain in good faith about EEO, as
with other mandatory subjects, is not restricted simply to the nego-
tiation of collective agreements. Collective bargaining is a con-
45. Farmers Coop. Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290, 67 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1968), en-
forced on this point sub nom. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126
(D.C. Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). See also Jubilee Mfg. Corp., 202
N.L.R.B. 272, 273, aff'd, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 179
N.L.R.B. 364, 72 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1969).
46. For example, in Farmers Coop. Compress, the Board dealt with racially
segregated employment conditions in a situation where the employer had refused to
bargain with the union about such conditions. In finding a violation of Section 8(a)(5),
the Board stated:
[B]argaining in good faith by respondent meant that respondent must
bargain in depth and meaningfully concerning any and all racial questions
which were alluded to by union negotiators during the bargaining.
Respondent's duty was and is to discuss with an open mind conditions as
they actually exist in the plant, including racial conditions and any racial
discrimination.
169 N.L.R.B. at 296.
47. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1304, 1354
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (union successfully grieved and arbitrated battery of tests for craft jobs
which had discriminatory impact on blacks; arbitrator found that use of such tests
violated contractual provisions).
48. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 69 (1975).
49. See note 3 supra.
50. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. at 66.
51. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
1980]
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tinuous process involving "pay adjustments in the contract and
other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by
existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights already
secured by contract.""2 The full bargaining context thus includes the
task of administering and policing such agreements, particularly the
processing of grievances based upon contract violations.
The legal recognition of the right to bargain about EEO mat-
ters has already had significant results in the negotiation of contract
provisions and in grievance and arbitration processing. A 1979 sur-
vey of 400 sample collective bargaining agreements found that
eighty-four per cent of the contracts banned discrimination on the
basis of race, color, creed, sex, national origin, or age, as compared
to only twenty-eight per cent of such contracts in 1965."3 Sixteen per
cent of the contracts containing such general non-discrimination
clauses further include a statement that the employer would comply
with any federal, state or local law prohibiting discrimination.'
Numerous arbitration decisions have dealt with the application of
such contract terms to specific individual situations.5
Beyond such general non-discrimination guarantees, unions
have the opportunity to negotiate for specific contract provisions
which deal with many of the issues that have been litigated in EEO
cases. The most successful and comprehensive application of this
negotiation method has occurred in the steel industry.' While the
use of tests by employers, for example, has been challenged in a
multitude of Title VII lawsuits 7 the steel industry has addressed
this problem through the bargaining process. Thus, a provision first
52. Conley v. Gibson, 365 U.S. 41, 46 (1957).
53. [19791 BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS (BNA) § 95:5.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. 159 (1976) (Weiss, Arb.)
(discharge based on sex discrimination); Middletown Bd. of Educ., 56 Lab. Arb. 830
(1971) (Hogan, Arb.) (mandatory maternity leave policy violates contract clause incor-
porating federal civil rights laws); Hough Mfg. Corp., 51 Lab. Arb. 785 (1968) (Mueller,
Arb.) (employer's refusal to assign job vacancy to woman violated contract provisions
and state fair employment practice laws).
56. For a frank and thorough discussion of the Steelworker Union's
negotiating posture and strategy, see Kleiman & Frankel, Seniority Remedies Under
Title VII The Steel Consent Decree-A Union Perspective, 28th ANNUAL N.Y.U. CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 177 (1975). See also Breedhof, "Collective Bargaining and Equal
Employment Opportunity: The Advantages of Voluntary Action"-unpublished paper,
ABA National Institute: Labor Law in the New Decade, May, 1980.
57. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1972); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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included in the basic labor agreement between the steel industry
and the United Steelworkers of America in 1968 provides that:
[W]here tests are used as an aid in making determinations
of the qualifications of an employee, such a test must ...
be job-related. A job-related test, whether oral, written,
or in the form of an actual work demonstration, is one
which measures whether an employee can satisfactorily
meet the specific requirements of that job including the
ability to absorb any training which may necessarily be
provided in connection with that job. A written test may
not be used unless the job requires reading comprehen-
sion, writing, or arithmetic skills and may be used to
measure the comprehension and skills required for such a
job . . . All tests shall be a) fair in their makeup and
their administration; b) free of cultural, racial, or ethnic
bias.
Testing procedures shall in all cases include notification to
an applicant of his deficiencies and an offer to counsel him
as to how he may overcome such deficiencies.'
Similar contract provisions cover testing requirements for admission
into sought-after apprenticeship programs. 9 The Steelworkers Union
advocated the testing clauses both because of the discriminatory im-
pact of the tests and because of their tendency to undermine senior-
ity rights." In addition, the union successfully grieved and ar-
bitrated under the contract's arbitration clause the discriminatory
impact of a battery of apprenticeship and craft tests used by United
States Steel in its plants around the country. After an adverse ar-
bitration ruling, the employer discontinued the use of the tests."1
58. Agreement Between United States Steel Corporation and the United
Steelworkers of America, Appendix "F', Memorandum of Understanding on Testing,
unpublished, reprinted in [19771 COLL. BARG. NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 29:66.
59. In the determination of relative ability and physical fitness as used
to fill apprenticeship vacancies .. .the Company shall be limited to use of
such examinations and testing procedures which are a) job related; b) fair
in their makeup and in their administration; c) free of cultural, racial or
ethnic bias.
Agreement between U.S. Steel Corp. and United Steelworkers of America, Appendix
"G", Memorandum of Understanding on Apprenticeship Training, reprinted in [19771
COLL. BARG. NEGOTIATIONS AND CONT. (BNA) 29:66-:67. This issue has also been exten-
sively litigated. Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
60. See Kleiman & Frankel, supra note 19, at 208.
61. Unpublished ruling, cited in Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 472
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Another frequently litigated Title VII issue is the
discriminatory impact of seniority systems which lock in prior dis-
criminatory employment decisions.82 In the steel industry this prob-
lem was ameliorated by collective bargaining, although the bargain-
ing was initiated by a Title VII lawsuit.63 A consent decree,"4 arrived
at after six months of intensive negotiations between government
agencies, the companies, and the union, was made a part of the Basic
Labor Agreement in the industry. 5 This decree, emerging from a
combination of litigation and collective bargaining, governs the sen-
iority system at more than 200 steel facilities across the country. It
fundamentally altered the system of seniority in the industry by
changing its basis from department to the entire plant. It also in-
itiated an affirmative action program for trade and craft jobs,67
established goals and timetables for greater employment of females
and minorities in occupations and job categories from which they
were excluded in the past, 8 and included significant back-pay
recovery." The decree likewise provided for the establishment of
Plant Implementation Committees"0 and an industry-wide Audit and
Review Committee71 to assure future compliance with the decree. To
the extent that the union and management remain in compliance,
the federal government agreed that Title VII and Executive Order
11246 are satisfied." Particularly in light of recent Supreme Court
F. Supp. 1304, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Title VII suit to enjoin same apprenticeship tests
at issue in the arbitration proceeding).
62. See, e.g., California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, __ U.S. __, 20 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 1 30,281 (1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
63. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 881 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also Kleiman & Frankel, note 19 supra.
64. The Consent Decrees are published in [19741 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN.
(BNA) 431:125-52.
65. "The terms of this decree shall be fully binding on the companies and
union, and the arrangements provided herein are hereby made a part of the defen-
dants' Basic Labor Agreement as though expressly incorporated therein." Id. at 142,
14.
66. Id. at 133, 4.
67. Id. at 138, 10.
68. Id. at 150, 2(a)(1)-(3)(b) + (c).
69. Id. at 143, 1 18.
70. Id. at 140, 12. At least one representative union member of the largest
minority group in the plant was to be included in each committee.
71. Id. at 141, 13. See also Introductory C of Consent Decrees I & II. The
industry-wide committee was composed of five members from management, five from
the union, and one from government.
72. Id. at 126, 1 C.
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pronouncements,"3 this solution to seniority issues produced through
negotiation and consent, represents an effective alternative to full-
scale adversarial litigation; the result obtained is at least as satisfac-
tory to the minority. workforce as any that might reasonably have
been expected from a court.
Perhaps most importantly, the decree achieved its substantive
results in a fashion that also conformed to the traditional bargaining
structure of the steel industry.74 Fundamental terms and conditions
of employment remain uniform throughout the industry. All major
companies must meet the same basic standards. The inequitable bur-
den placed upon one company sued in a Title VII suit, both in terms
of legal costs and in terms of any resulting idiosyncratic alteration
of wages and seniority arrangements, was thereby avoided. Most
critically, as the decree is applied to practice, its terms allow the
parties to utilize their established private dispute resolution
mechanism to resolve future issues that may arise under it."5 Thus,
the bargaining process was substituted in part for litigation, and, at
least potentially, the arbitration mechanism is made available for
the solution of future disputes.
Numerous other unions have employed private collective
bargaining to deal with EEO issues. The International Union of
Electrical Workers (IUE) has consistently sought the elimination of
sex discriminatory practices through contract provisions in the area
of insurance and maternity benefits, job assignments, and wage
rates." The United Auto Workers secured a pledge of non-
discrimination in hiring from General Motors77 and established
73. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(bona fide seniority systems, even if they perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimina-
tion, do not violate Title VII); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). See
generally Note, Seniority- The Relevant Scope of Inquiry for Determining the Legal-
ity of a Seniority System, 31 VAND. L. REv. 151 (1978). In the aftermath of Teamsters,
the lower federal courts have attempted to apply the Supreme Court's definition of
"bona fide" seniority system under § 703(j). See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fit-
tings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Nickel v. Highway Indus., 441 F. Supp. 477
(W.D. Wis. 1977).
74. See Breedhof, note 18 supra.
75. E.g., United States Steel Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 663 (1976) (Das, Arb.)
(employer must grant job to employee with plant-wide seniority pursuant to Steel Con-
sent Decree). See also United States Steel Corp., 66 Lab. Arb. 687 (1976) (Garrett,
Arb.) (in dispute over job bidding, matter was referred to Audit and Review Commit-
tee established under Consent Decree).
76. See discussion infra at notes 129-33.
77. General Motors & United Automobile Workers Letter of Agreement of
September 14, 1979, reprinted in [1979] COLL. BARG. NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) §
21:94 (Doc. #27).
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"equal application" committees on both the national and the local
level to deal with EEO disputes."8 The Communication Workers of
America bargained for and secured a maternity leave policy that an-
ticipated some of the benefits granted women by the 1978 amend-
ments to Title VII." The International Woodworkers of America, as
part of its EEO program, initiated a special union-employer
grievance and arbitration procedure for individual claims of discrim-
ination. All costs, including those of the grievant and his represent-
ative, are paid by the employer." Many unions have also negotiated
worksharing plans to offset the disparate impact that layoffs may
have on minorities and women."
Unions have important opportunities to advance EEO within
the grievance-arbitration process as well. Contract clauses govern-
ing this process can and should be broadened to enable the ar-
bitrators to apply relevant statutes, regulations and court
decisions.2 The Supreme Court decision in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., holding that an unfavorable arbitration ruling does not
bar an employee from bringing a subsequent Title VII action,83 could
undermine the finality of an arbitrator's ruling. Nevertheless, even
that holding suggests that under proper circumstances the court in
which such subsequent action is eventually brought may accord the
prior ruling great weight." The court may look to a variety of fac-
tors in determining the weight to assign the arbitrator's decision in-
cluding the degree to which the contract provisions conform to Title
VII, procedural fairness, the adequacy of the record and the com-
petence of the arbitrator." To the extent these conditions are met it
may be anticipated that most employees will have little incentive to
78. Id. (Doe. #28).
79. Collective Bargaining Agreement between Ohio Bell & Communications
Workers of America, 1977-80, Attachment "A" Maternity Payment Plan, reprinted at
[1979] COLL. BARG. NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) § 22.45. See Pub. Law #95-555 (Oct.
31. 1978), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which restored benefits and protections to pregnant
women which had been severely limited in General Elec. v. Gilbert, 492 U.S. 125 (1976).
80. Youngdahl, Equal Employment and Affirmative Action: The Union Role,
27TH N.Y.U. ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 179 (1975).
81. Sixteen percent of 400 sample contracts contain some form of work-
sharing (cutting back the hours of all employees equally) as an alternative or a prelude
to layoffs. [1979] COLL. BARG. NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) § 60:3.
82. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 56 Lab. Arb. 830 (1971) (Hogan, Arb.). See
generally Newman, Post Gardner-Denver Developments in the Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANNUAL MEEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 36 (1975).
83. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
84. Id. at 60, n.21.
85. Id.
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re-litigate their discrimination claim."' The American Arbitration
Association has, in fact, drafted a set of rules designed to cover
many of these issues.87
The processing of grievances can also affect a general class of
workers. Grievances are not inherently limited to the correction of
individual cases of discrimination.8 Claims of systemic discrimina-
tion, functionally akin to class actions in the courts, can be raised
before an arbitrator in many circumstances. 8 Even individual ar-
bitration rulings have potentially broader effects since "one would
hardly expect an employer to continue in effect an employment prac-
tice that routinely results in adverse arbitral decision."'
Clearly, therefore, not only is the duty to bargain in good faith
about EEO matters well entrenched in both theory and actual labor
practice, but the arbitration mechanism provides a potential alter-
native enforcement mechanism for the routine implementation of the
rights and programs won through collective bargaining. Certain in-
dustries already provide models for other unions to follow in volun-
tarily fulfilling that duty. In addition, the National Labor Relations
Board has recognized the value of this approach as a remedial
mechanism for dealing with past discrimination. It has ordered one
union engaged in discriminatory conduct to propose specific contrac-
tual provisions designed to prohibit racial discrimination and to
bargain in good faith with the employer to obtain such provisions."
Similarly, in a case involving discrimination in job assignments be-
86. Blumrosen, Individual Worker-Employer Arbitration Under Title VII,
31ST ANNUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR LAW 329, 335 (1979).
87. See Coulson, Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules-An Available
Alternative, 25TH ANNUAL SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON LABOR
LAW 311 (1979). The rules are contained in an Appendix. Id. at 325-34. Arbitration of
discrimination claims has generated considerable controversy. See, e.g., Gould, Labor
Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40
(1960); Glanston, Arbitration of EEO Issues: A Dissenting View, 32d ANNUAL N.Y.U.
CONFERENCE ON LABOR LAW 155 (1979); and Newman, note 82 supra.
88. See the unpublished arbitration of a grievance concerning employer's use
of non-validated tests cited in Dickerson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 1304, 1354
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
89. See, e.g., ASG Indus., Inc., 62 Lab. Arb. 849 (1974) (Foster, Arb.) (elimina-
tion of unvalidated tests); Middletown Bd. of Educ., 56 Lab. Arb. 830 (1971) (Hogan,
Arb.).
90. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 67 (1975).
91. Local Union 12, Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, (Business
League of Gadsden), 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 322, affd sub. nom. Local 12, Rubber Workers
v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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tween black and white drivers, the EEOC found that the union had
failed in representing its black members because it was "obligated
to propose to the employer contract provisions aimed at prohibiting
continued racial discrimination" in terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 2 Thus both federal agencies principally involved in adminis-
tering national labor policy have harnessed private collective
bargaining for EEO goals.
The ultimate judicial authorization for and endorsement of
private actions seeking to respond to EEO concerns is a very recent
matter. Only in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber93 did the
Supreme Court affirm the use of such private mechanisms beyond
those necessary to comply with the requirements of Title VII, even
though they entail a degree of race-conscious selection which might
hitherto have posed the threat of a Title VII-based reverse
discrimination claim. In 1974, the U.S.W.A. and Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corporation entered into a master collective bargaining
agreement covering the terms and conditions of employment at fif-
teen Kaiser plants. This agreement contained an affirmative action
plan designed to eliminate long-standing racial imbalance in Kaiser's
almost exclusively white craft work force. Hiring goals were set for
each plant based on the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.
To meet such goals, on-the-job training programs were established
to teach unskilled incumbent production workers-black and
white-the skills necessary to become craft workers. Selection of
trainees was made on the basis of seniority, with a proviso that at
least fifty per cent of the new trainees were to be black until the
percentage of black skilled craft workers approximated the percent-
age of blacks in the local labor force.94
The Supreme Court affirmed the legality of the U.S.W.A.-
Kaiser plan against a challenge by a white worker who alleged that
the program had resulted in a black employee, junior in seniority,
receiving training in preference to himself, violating § 703(a)" and
92. EEOC Decision 71-1477, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 494 (1971).
93. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
94. Id. at 208-09.
95. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for as employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
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(d) of Title VII. The Court noted that the issue was the "narrow
statutory" one of whether Title VII forbids private employers and
unions from voluntarily agreeing to bona fide affirmative action pro-
grams that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the pur-
pose provided in the Kaiser-U.S.W.A. plan .
7
The legislative history of Title VII makes it clear that Con-
gress did not intend to prohibit voluntary and private affirmative
action efforts designed to solve the problem of minority disadvan-
tage in the workplace:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of
the causes and consequences of racial and other types of
discrimination against minorities. There is reason to
believe, however, that national leadership provided by the
enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most
troublesome problems will create an atmosphere con-
ducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of
discrimination."
Rather than prohibiting the private sector from initiating affirm-
ative action programs, Title VII was intended to galvanize employer
and union evaluation of their employment practices and to spur
voluntary elimination of imbalances in traditionally segregated job
categories.9 The Kaiser-U.S.W.A. plan, designed to eliminate con-
spicuous racial imbalance, fell within the area of discretion thus left
to the private sector by Title VII. °°
Weber constitutes a vigorous endorsement for such private in-
itiatives."° The decision should serve to dispel any genuine fears on
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
96. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer,
labor, organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling ap-
prenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any
program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
97. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
98. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355, 2393, quoted in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at
203-04 (emphasis added).
99. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 203-09.
100. Id. at 209.
101. Although the plan was voluntary, both the employer and the union may
have acted in response to outside pressures. The company feared action by the Office
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the part of either employers or unions that they will be subject to
liability under a Title VII reverse discrimination theory for pri-
vate affirmative measures.' Thus, neither would have to admit
past discriminatory practices, with attendant potential liability, in
order to justify internal remedial efforts. The practical significance
of this is incalculable. Through their own negotiated mechanisms,
the parties may structure solutions to problems of discrimination on
an employer-wide or even an industry-wide level, so long as they do
not "trammel the interest of non-minority employees.1 3 They may
also apportion the cost of such programs among themselves and
within the industry, taking into account such factors as the distribu-
tion of labor costs and the structure of collective bargaining in the
industry.
The decision in Weber, however, does not merely deny
reverse discrimination as a potential challenge to private EEO ac-
tivity. It endorses that private activity and actively extends its
jurisdiction by validating a program collectively bargained over,
agreed to, and enforced by the parties, which goes beyond the bare
requirements of Title VII. The parties are given discretion to attack
problems and fashion remedies beyond those that would have been
open to the EEOC and the courts. They may produce results which
are beyond those which Title VII requires, or those which a court
might order to remedy a proven violation of the Act.0 4 In this way,
the Weber court has both removed a potential obstacle to private
EEO measures and affirmatively added an active incentive, at least
for minority group members, to seek to utilize those private
mechanisms in vindicating their claims. In addition, the affirmative
action program in Weber was designed "to eliminate conspicuous
racial imbalance in traditionally-segregated job categories.'' 1 The
Court did not define such categories, but the fact that it affirmed a
program a designed to "abolish traditional patterns of racial seg-
of Federal Contract Compliance under Executive Order 11246, and both company and
union sought to obviate private Title VII actions. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum Corp.,
562 F.2d 216, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., concurring).
102. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
103. The Supreme Court noted that the affirmative action here required no
discharges of white employees, did not create an absolute bar to the advancement of
whites, and was temporary in nature. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
104. Id. at 200. See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779
(1976) (collective bargaining serves the policies of Title VII, sometimes "furthering
public policy interests beyond what is required by statute .....
105. 443 U.S. at 209.
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regation and hierarchy""' may well indicate that such plans can deal
with patterns of segregation in housing, education, and employment
beyond the control of employer and the union,1'1 even problems
associated with so-called "de facto" segregation."8 Finally, the
private and voluntary nature of the plans should produce greater
support for them, both within the union and from employers who
have had a share in designing them, thus validating the broader dis-
cretion accorded by the Weber court to private, non-litigative pro-
cesses.
In sum, unions may utilize their position in the collective bargain-
ing relationship to secure terms and conditions of employment which
are in accord with the purposes of our national non-discrimination
policies. They may also advocate affirmative programs designed to
alter long-standing and often non-litigable inequities, and as in
Weber, even majority employees may benefit from the programs
generated.
The Employer's Duty To Provide Information To The Union
Intertwined with the duty to bargain in good faith is the
employer's duty to supply the union, upon request, with sufficient
information to enable the latter to understand, intelligently discuss,
and act upon the issues raised in the bargaining process.'" The con-
cept of good-faith bargaining implies rational dialogue, "an inter-
change of ideas, [and] communication of facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of either party.""0 The refusal to supply information is as
much a part of a violation of § 8(a)(5) as any other failure to fulfill
the duty to bargain.
The Supreme Court endorsed this fundamental principle in
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co."' During contract negotiations, the
employer asserted that it was financially unable to meet the union's
wage demands and that satisfaction of the union's demands would
put it out of business. The union requested that the employer allow
it to examine the company's books and records. In deciding that the
company's refusal to allow such an examination violated § 8(a)(5), the
106. Id. at 204.
107. Rabin, Affirmative Action Programs Before and After Weber, 32d AN-
NUAL N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 201, 234 (979).
108. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
109. See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, ch. 11, § IV (1971).
110. S.C. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714 (1936).
111. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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Supreme Court held that "[Glood faith bargaining necessarily re-
quires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims....
If such an argument is important enough to present in the give-and-
take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of
proof of its accuracy. . . .""' The Court's decisions in Truitt endorsed
a long series of Board cases"1 ' finding violations of the duty to
bargain where employers refused to substantiate and prove asser-
tions of poor financial conditions. Moreover, the duty to provide in-
formation continues through the life of the agreement, at least to
the extent that access to new or additional information is necessary
to enable the parties to administer the contract and resolve
grievances or disputes. Thus, in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,' the
employer's refusal to provide information was found to be a viola-
tion of its duty to bargain under § 8(a)(5) when the union had filed
grievances regarding a sub-contracting dispute and requested that
the company supply it with information concerning the underlying
subject matter of the grievance."5
The Supreme Court and the Board have adopted a liberal test
for determining what information must be turned over to the union.
Information must be conveyed where there is a "probability that the
desired information [is] relevant and that it would be of use to the
union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities....
The standard for relevance is to be the relatively broad one used in
pre-trial discovery."7 The breadth of this relevancy test has impor-
tant ramifications for unions which utilize the collective bargaining
process to confront EEO issues.
Accurate and comprehensive information is a necessary precon-
dition for union activity which seeks to secure equal employment op-
portunity. The union needs to know, for example, the distribution
and placement of minorities and women through departments and
pay grades and the effect of such existing contract provisions as
seniority and transfer rules on these groups. Such basic data is
critical both for those unions attempting to deal with practices
112. Id. at 152-53.
113. Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 836, 842-43 (1936); Fawcett Printing
Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 964 (1973). See Fanning, The Obligation to Furnish Information
During the Contract Tern, 9 GEO. L. REV. 375 (1975).
114. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
115. Id. at 439.
116. Id. at 437; NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Jacobs
Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
117. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 n.6 (1967).
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which may violate federal EEO statutes, and for those considering
or advocating affirmative programs designed to meet economic ine-
quities. As noted above, it is now clear that privately bargained af-
firmative programs akin to that instituted in Weber may push
beyond what Title VII requires of unions, and even beyond what a
court might order to remedy a past proven violation of the statute.""
In embarking on such programs the union and the employer are act-
ing in a manner analogous to a legislature, dealing with deeply
rooted social and economic problems,"" but without the constitu-
tional ramifications of government action. 0
The increased number of anti-discrimination clauses in national
collective bargaining agreements,' along with unions' efforts to en-
force these clauses through the collective bargaining process"2 and
through their advocacy of affirmative action measures,"' have
brought a number of EEO issues before the NLRB. In particular,
union requests for data and information on the racial and sexual
composition of the employer's workforce and employer resistance to
such demands have sparked a flurry of administrative proceedings
before the Board and in the courts. Since 1978, ten cases have been
decided by the NLRB on this and related issues." Numerous other
118. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
119. Fullilove v. Klutznick, - U.S. - , 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980). See also Ford
Motor Corp. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("A wide range of reasonableness
must be allowed a statutory, bargaining representative serving the unit it represents,
subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion.").
120. __ U.S. - , 100 S. Ct. at 2780.
121. See notes 53-56, 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., IMC Chemical, 73 Lab. Arb. 215 (1979) (Owen, Arb.) (arbitration
award of "constructive seniority" to applicants rejected because of race or sex). See
also notes 80-88 supra and accompanying text.
123. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), discussed at
notes 93-106 supra.
124. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. & Communications Workers of America, 103
L.R.R.M. 1127 (247 NLRB No. 27) (1980); Brazos Electrical Power Coop., Inc. & IBEW
Local 346, 101 L.R.R.M. 1003 (241 NLRB No. 160) (1979); Bendix Corp. & IUE Local
759, 101 L.R.R.M. 1118 (242 NLRB No. 8) (1979); Safeway Stores, Inc. & Retail Clerks,
Local 455, 100 L.R.R.M. 1382 (240 NLRB No. 138) (1979); Markle Mfg.. & IUE, 100
L.R.R.M. 1230 (239 NLRB No. 187) (1979); Safeway Stores, Inc. & Local 455, Retail
Clerks, 100 L.R.R.M. 1251 (239 NLRB No. 187) (1979); Kentile Floors, Inc. & Rubber
Workers, Local 505, 101 L.R.R.M. 1236 (242 NRLB No. 115) (1979); GM Corp. & IUE,
101 L.R.R.M. 1461 (243 NLRB No. 19) (1979); White Farm Equip. Co. & IUE, 101
L.R.R.M. 1470 (242 NLRB No. 201) (1979); The Bendix Corp. & Local 897 IUE, 101
L.R.R.M. 1459 (242 NLRB No. 170) (1979); East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 99 L.R.R.M.
1499 (239 NLRB No. 20) (1978); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. 1482 (239 NLRB
No. 19) (1978).
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cases are pending before the Board or have been settled."5 Seven
petitions for Review and Cross-Applications for Enforcement of
Board orders are presently pending before the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. 2 ' The most significant of these involve the
Board's decisions in Westinghouse Electric Corporation"2 and East
Dayton Tool & Die Co."'
The International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, CLC ("IUE") has represented approximately
22,000 employees at forty Westinghouse plants across the country
since 1950.2" The elimination of race and sex discrimination has been
a regular subject of national bargaining between the parties. In
1954, IUE and Westinghouse inserted in their national collective
bargaining agreement for the first time a provision "reaffirming
their intention that the provisions of this agreement and of local
supplements will continue to be applied without discrimination
125. White Consol. Indus., Case No. 8-CA-13941; Emerson Elec. Co., Case No.
14-CA-12654; Chrysler Corp. Airtemp Div., Case No. 9-CA-13941; Ambec Indus., Inc.,
Case No. 26-CA-7959; Stackpole Carbon Co., Case No. 6-CA-12605; Lucky Markets,
Case No. 31-CA-8898; Walt Disney Prods., Case No. 31-CA-9467 (complaint issued,
resolved through voluntary settlement); General Elec. Corp., Case No. 1-CA-16074
(complaint issued, resolved through voluntary settlement). Telephone interview with
Michael Balsamo, NLRB Office of General Counsel (May 13, 1980).
126. GMC and IUE, NLRB Case No. 9-CA-9275, 243 NLRB No. 19 (June 29,
1979), petitions for review and application for enforcement pending, Nos. 79-1682,
79-1892, 79-2563 (D.C. Cir.); White Farm Equip. and IUE, NLRB Case No. 9-CA-8835,
242 NLRB No. 201 (June 22, 1979), petitions for review and application for enforce-
ment pending, Nos. 79-1654, 79-1864, 79-2562 (D.C. Cir.); The Bendix Corp. and IUE
Local 807, NLRB Case No. 24-CA-7316, 242 NLRB No. 170 (June 11, 1979), petition for
review and application for enforcement pending, Nos. 79-1609, 79-1795 (D.C. Cir.);
Automation and Measurement Div., The Bendix Corp. and IUE, NLRB Case No.
9-CA-8762, 242 NLRB No. 8 (May 8. 1979), petition for review pending, No. 79-1479
(D.C. Cir.); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & IUE, NLRB Case No. 6-CA-7680, 239 NLRB
No. 19 (October 31, 1978), petition for review and application for enforcement
pending,Nos. 78-2067, 78-2262, 80-1181, 80-1182, 80-1183 (D.C. Cir.); East Dayton Tool &
Die Co. and IUE, NLRB Case No. 9-CA-8887, 239 NLRB No. 20 (October 31, 1978), peti-
tions for review and application for enforcement pending, Nos. 78-2066, 78-2261,
79-2395 (D.C. Cir.); Kentile Floors, Inc. and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic
Workers, Local 505, NLRB Case No. 13-CA-15224, 242 NLRB No. 115 (June 4, 1979),
petition for review and application for enforcement pending, Nos. 79-1641, 79-2055
(D.C. Cir.).
127. 99 L.R.R.M. 1482 (239 NLRB No. 19) (1978).
128. 99 L.R.R.M. 1499 (239 NLRB No. 20) (1978).
129. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Case No. 6-CA-7680, slip op. at 5, NLRB
Region 6, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Decision of Administrative Law Judge Marvin Roth, Feb.
17, 1976) [hereinafter cited as A.L.J. Decision]. See also Note, The Union as Title VII
Plaintiff- Affirmative Obligation to Litigate? 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1388 (1978).
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because of race, creed, color, or national origin."'" Over the years
the union also proposed, generally without success, contract
language dealing with issues of equal pay, pregnancy benefits, plant-
wide posting of jobs, and other EEO issues."' The anti-discrimina-
tion clause of the agreement was amended in 1966 to include a
reference to sex and again in 1970 to add age. 3 ' The anti-
discrimination clause, however, is not subject to contractual arbitra-
tion. 3' As a consequence, the IUE has made clear that it is willing to
institute litigation against the company in order to eliminate what it
considers to be discriminatory practices. The union has, in fact, filed
charges with the EEOC and instituted class actions against
Westinghouse to remedy alleged sex discrimination.'"
Beginning in 1972, IUE requested that the company furnish
various data on the racial and sexual composition of its workforce."
The company generally rejected these requests, although some data
was furnished which indicated that female employees were predom-
inantly employed at lower labor grades than men.'36 In June, 1974,
the Union renewed its demand for EEO information, specifically re-
questing from each Westinghouse location represented by the IUE a
breakdown of labor grade, classification and wage rate, day work
and incentive basis, seniority, hiring, and promotions or upgrades,
all tallied by race, sex, and Spanish surname. The IUE also sought a
list of fair employment complaints and charges filed against West-
inghouse under federal and state laws.'" The union later requested
130. Westinghouse's employment practices, particularly with respect to sex
discrimination issues such as wage differentials and pregnancy benefits, have been the
subject of numerous administrative and judicial proceedings. As far back as 1945,
Westinghouse was found to have long-standing wage differentials between rates for
women's and men's jobs; as a result women were paid significantly less than men for
performing similar work. General Elec. Co. & Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 28 War Lab.
Bd. Rep. 666.
131. A.L.J. Decision, supra note 129, at 8.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., UE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450
(D.N.J. 1979).
135. A.L.J. Decision, supra note 129, at 10.
136. Id.
137. The union specifically requested the following:
1. The number of male and female employees, blacks, and
Spanish-surnamed employees at each labor grade.
2. The number of employees by race, sex, and Spanish surname in
each classification in the bargaining unit and the wage rate for
each classification.
3. The number of employees by race, sex, and Spanish surname in
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copies of Westinghouse's most current Affirmative Action program"
each classification in each plant who are paid on a daywork
basis and who are paid on an incentive basis.
4. The number of employees by race, sex, and Spanish surname
who have less than 1 year's seniority, 1-2 years' seniority, 3-4
years' seniority, 5-9 years' seniority, 10-19 years' seniority, and
20 or more years' seniorty.
5. The number of persons hired in each classification during the
12-month period ending May 31, 1974, with a breakdown as to
sex, race, and Spanish surnames, showing the sex of all black
and Spanish-surnamed persons.
6. The number of promotions or upgrades for the 12-month period
ending May 31, 1974, broken down by race, sex, and Spanish-
surnamed persons showing the job level of each upgraded
employee prior to and subsequent to each such upgrade and
the race, sex, and whether Spanish-surnamed for each of these
upgraded employees.
7. A list of all complaints and charges filed against Westinghouse
under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, Executive Order 11246,
and state fair employment practices laws, and copies of each
complaint or charge.
Id. at 3.
138. Affirmative Action Programs (AAP) are mandated by the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs of government contractors pursuant to Ex-
ecutive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). The requirements of such AAPs are
set out in Revised Order 4, Affirmative Action Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. 60-2 (1978). An
AAP is a "set of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits
himself to apply every good faith effort .. " Revised Order 4, Affirmative Action
Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. 60-2 (Oct. 20, 1978). Specific requirements include the following:
An acceptable affirmative action program must include an analysis
of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of
minority groups and women, and further, goals and timetables to which
the contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the defi-
ciencies and, thus to achieve prompt and full utilization of minorities and
women, at all levels and in all segments of his work force where defi-
ciencies exist.
§ 60-2.12 Establishment of goals and timetables.
(a) The goals and timetables developed by the contractor should
be attainable in terms of the contractor's analysis of his deficiencies and
his entire affirmative action program.
(c) Goals should be significant, measurable and attainable.
(d) Goals should be specific for planned results, with timetables
for completion.
§ 60-2.23 Identification of problem areas by organizational units and job
group.
(b) If any of the following items are found in the analysis, special
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and accompanying Work Force Analysis139 for each of the plants
covered by the national agreement.
The company rejected the union's information request, main-
taining that such information was not material or relevant to the ex-
isting bargaining relationship, that it would be burdensome to com-
pile, and that it was to be used to secure information on which to
base further lawsuits. 40 A series of negotiations followed the union's
information requests but the parties ultimately reached impasse on
the issue.""
corrective action should be appropriate.
(1) An "underutilization" of minorities or women in specific job
groups.
(2) Lateral and/or vertical movement of minority or female
employees occuring at a lessor rate (compared to work force mix) than
that of nonminority or male employees.
(3) The selection process eliminates a significantly higher percent-
age of minorities or women than nonminorities or men.
(4) Application and related preemployment forms not in com-
pliance with Federal legislation.
(5) Position descriptions inaccurate in relation to actual functions
and duties.
(6) Formal or scored selection procedures not validated as re-
quired by the OFCCP Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures.
Id.
139. A Work Force Analysis (WFA) is an integral part of the AAP. It is defined
as: "A listing of each job title as appears in applicable collective bargaining
agreements or payroll records .. " Id. at 60-2.11.
For each job title the total number of male and female incumbents,
and the total number of male and female incumbents in each of the follow-
ing groups must be given: Blacks, Spanish-surnamed Americans,
American Indians, and Orientals. The wage rate or salary range for each
job title must be given. All job titles, including all managerial job titles,
must be listed.
(b) An analysis of all major job groups at the facility, with ex-
planation if minorities or women are currently being underutilized in any
one or more job groups ("job groups" herein meaning one or a group of
jobs having similar content, wage rates and opportunites). "Underutiliza-
tion" is defined as having fewer minorities or women in a particular job
group than would reasonably be expected by their availability.
Id.
140. A.L.J. Decision, supra note 129, at 11-14.
141. Id. at 15. With respect to the AAP, Westinghouse contended it contained
confidential financial information and "candid self-analysis." The company counter-
proposed furnishing work force data to the union if the union "would agree to treat
this information as strictly confidential, commercial, or financial information and agree
not to release it or publicize it in any way." Id. at 14. The union responded by offering
to treat the proffered information as confidential for "representation purposes," which
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While the negotiations were proceeding, the union had filed un-
fair labor practice charges against Westinghouse, and a complaint
was issued charging Westinghouse with violations of § 8(a)(5)4 and
§ 8(a)(1)"'I of the NLRA. On February 16, 1976, after a lengthy hear-
ing, Administrative Law Judge Marvin Ross found that Westinghouse
had violated the Act by refusing to furnish the IUE with the infor-
mation requested as that information applied to bargaining unit em-
ployees." As a remedy for these unfair labor practices, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge ordered Westinghouse to produce, with limited
exceptions, the information requested by the union. Both Westing-
house and the union filed exceptions to the Administrative Law
Judge's opinion.
Oral arguments before the full 5-member Board were ordered
in this and the companion East Dayton Tool & Die Co. case."4 5 This
is an unusual procedure reserved for issues of importance concern-
ing administration of the NLRA. In addition to the charging union
and respondent, a number of national organizations participated as
amici curiae before the Board in these cases."' The Board affirmed
the Administrative Law Judge's decision in most particulars and
found that Westinghouse had violated the Act.' 7
The Board's analysis began with a review of the legal prin-
ciples of the employer's duty to disclose information to a union. Ap-
plying the liberal test of relevancy,"' the Board found that the infor-
it defined as use 1) to formulate demands for collective bargaining negotiations; 2) to
decide on the most appropriate course of action in connection with employee
grievances; 3) to determine the need for proceeding before federal and state courts and
agencies to protect the rights of employees; 4) for use as evidence in grievance pro-
ceedings and proceedings before administrative agencies or courts. Id. at 15. This was
unacceptable to Westinghouse.
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), note 40 supra.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7."
144. A.L.J. Decision, note 129 supra.
145. East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 99 L.R.R.M. 1499 (239 NLRB No. 20) (1978).
In this case the IUE had requested inter alia the number of applicants seeking employ-
ment with the company and the number of persons hired, both broken down by race
and sex, and the reasons why the company employed so few females and blacks.
146. These included the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the
United Automobile Workers, the United States Department of Labor, and the Equal
Employment Advisory Council.
147. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. 1482 (239 NLRB No. 19) (1978).
The Board also held that the employer in East Dayton had likewise violated the Act.
99 L.R.R.M. 1499 (239 NLRB No. 20) (1978).
148. See note 117 supra.
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mation requested by the union was undoubtedly relevant to the
IUE's role as collective bargaining representative. The contract be-
tween the IUE and Westinghouse contained a non-discrimination
clause,149 and the Board found that the union's request for race and
sex data constituted an effort by the union to determine whether
the contractual non-discrimination policy was being followed. The re-
quest was thus an effort by the union to monitor and police the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.150 The majority view
was that even absent an anti-discrimination clause in a collective
bargaining agreement, the union's status as a representative of the
employees and its consequent duty of fair representation 5M entitled
the union to information related to race and sex in order to make
contract proposals and to take other appropriate action to correct
employment discrimination." 2 Setting out a broad rule for future
cases, the Board held that it would apply the same procedural stan-
149. See notes 129-37 supra and accompanying text.
150. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1486.
151. The duty of fair representation (DFR), a corollary of the unions' exclusive
representative status, is a judicially created doctrine first enunciated in Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In Steele, which arose under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976), the union had excluded blacks from member-
ship and negotiated seniority provisions designed to deprive blacks of job oppor-
tunities. The Court held that such actions violated the union's duty to represent
employees "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." Id. at
204. Nine years later, the duty was applied to unions covered by the NLRA. Ford
Motor Co. v. Hoffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). In the grievance processing context,
however, "A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a
union's conduct . . .is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (citations omitted). Vaca also took cognizance of the NLRB's
holding in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963), that a breach of the DFR constitutes an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(b) of the NLRA. For breach of the DFR, a union may be sued for damages, Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), or injunctive relief, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944), or have its NLRB certification revoked, Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318,
32 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1953).
The literature on the DFR is extensive. See, e.g., THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESEN-
TATION: PAPERS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTA-
TION (J. McKelvey ed., Cornell University 1977); Sovern, The National Labor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1962); Clark, The-Duty of Fair
Representation" A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1119 (1973); Cox, The Duty
of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957).
152. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1486. The Board was silent
about whether a union has an affirmative duty to seek out discrimination and try to
eliminate it. Member Jenkins added that a union has, "in addition to and because of its
duty of fair representation, an obligation to endeavor to prevent the establishment of a
discriminatory practice and thus the correlative right to information relating to such
discrimination." Id. at 1468 n.15. Whether Member Jenkins was here referring to a
practice solely under the control of an employer is not clear.
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dard to requests for statistical data relating to employment prac-
tices as it applied to requests for wage data, namely, that such infor-
mation is presumed relevant.15
Having determined that most of the requested information was
relevant, the Board then addressed the company's defenses.
Throughout the administrative proceedings, Westinghouse had
asserted that the real reason the union requested the data was to
prosecute lawsuits against it and not for bargaining purposes or ad-
ministration of the collective agreement. 54 The majority rejected
this contention. "[T]he availability of Title VII does not restrict
rights under the National Labor Relations Act, and the existence of
Title VII litigation should not restrict the union's statutory right to
relevant information concerning alleged discrimination. ' "'  The use
of overlapping forums and remedies in the labor relations area is
common, 56 particularly in employment discrimination cases .157 There-
fore, the IUE's actions in filing and prosecuting administrative
charges and lawsuits were not inconsistent with its duties as a bar-
gaining representative."
The Board likewise rejected Westinghouse's contention that
furnishing the information would be unduly burdensome. As a gov-
ernment contractor, Westinghouse already is required to compile
most of the requested data. 59 The Board required the company to
furnish the union with copies of all complaints and charges filed
against it under federal and state fair employment laws, although it
could delete the name of the charging party. Unlike the previous
153. The rule governing disclosure of data of this kind is not unlike that
prevailing in discovery procedures under modern codes. There the infor-
mation must be disclosed unless it plainly appears irrelevant. Any less le-
nient rule in labor disputes would greatly hamper the bargaining process,
for it is virtually impossible to tell in advance whether the requested data
will be relevant except in those infrequent instances in which the inquiry
is patently outside the bargaining issue.
99 L.R.R.M. at 1487 (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187
F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951)).
154. A.L.J. Decision, supra note 129, at 4.
155. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1489.
156. E.g. NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421 (1967) (NLRB and Arbitrators
have overlapping jurisdiction to enforce agreements).
157. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (unfavorable arbitra-
tion ruling does not prevent later Title VII suit); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (§ 1981 provides remedy independent of Title VII in employ-
ment cases).
158. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1489.
159. See notes 138-39 supra.
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data which the employer automatically was required to disclose,
however, such information was not presumptively relevant. Disclo-
sure was ordered because the union had demonstrated its need for
the information. Unions must be able to gauge employee dissatisfac-
tion in order to determine whether contract provisions were being
complied with, and to decide what changes are necessary. l0
Finally, Westinghouse unsuccessfully contended that such
charges and complaints were intended to be confidential. The ma-
jority held that Title VII was binding only upon the EEOC and did
not govern relations between private parties. Title VII prohibitions
against disclosure"'1 were aimed at making unproven charges un-
available to the general public' and are thus inapplicable to the
union acting in its representative capacity.'63
Board Member Murphy dissented vigorously from almost all
aspects of the majority decision. 4 In Murphy's view, the Board's
decision will require unions to seek such data from employers in
order to protect themselves against potential liability under Title
VII or the duty of fair representation. Those unions which do not
160. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1490.
161. Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall con-
tain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.
Charges shall not be made public by the Commission .... Any person who
makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both....
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) (1976).
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to
make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the
Commission pursuant to its [investigative] authority under this section
prior to the institution of any proceeding under this title involving such
information. Any officer or employee of the Commission who shall make
public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsec-
tion shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.
Id. at § 2000e-8(e). See also 29 C.F.R. 1601.20-.26 (1979).
162. The legislative history of these proposals indicates that the Board is cor-
rect. The bans against making charges public were directed "at the making available
to the general public of unproven charges." 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Humphrey). Section 709(e) was specifically directed at preventing "the Com-
mission and its employees from making public information obtained by compulsory pro-
cess in the course of its investigation except in the course of litigation arising under
the title." Id. These provisions do not reach the issues of whether a union, acting pur-
suant to its responsibilities under the NRLA should have access to such charges. See
also H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
939 (1973).
163. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1492.
164. Id. at 1493-99 (Murphy, M., dissenting).
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affirmatively seek out the data will risk being found to have ac-
quiesced in unlawful practices of the employer. Further, she argued,
since the requests are not for collective bargaining purposes, the
adversarial relationship they engender will not encourage the
peaceful settlement of labor disputes which the Act intended. By
ordering the employer to turn over copies of the EEOC charges and
the information prepared by the employer for federal enforcement
agencies, the Board's decision breaches the confidentiality of such in-
formation and will make employers less candid in preparing such
data. In sum, she urged that the Board's decisions will eventually
produce negative results, including increased litigation, confusion
among the parties as to their duties, and greater delay in adminis-
tration of the Act."6 5
The dissent's fears are misplaced. The decision of the Board
majority in Westinghouse correctly applied well-settled labor law
principles to a new factual setting.166 First, the Board's decision pro-
vides the discovery tools necessary for unions to pursue effectively
EEO issues within the particular collective bargaining relationship.
Without the access to generalized data which the Westinghouse
decision provides, the union must rely solely upon individual
grievances and complaints from its members to assess the impact of
contract provisions or other workplace practices on minorities and
women. The Board's decision thus enables unions to negotiate,
grieve and arbitrate, and take other action on behalf of minority
workers much more effectively.
165. Member Murphy likewise dissented in East Dayton. Again she warned
that unions now might be held liable for the discriminatory practices of the employers,
in this case activity prior to the hiring of the employee. Such matters, in her view, are
solely within the control of the employer and not subject to mandatory bargaining
with the union. Data concerning applicants for employment was not relevant in any
way to the union's representation of unit employees. A request for information con-
cerning the race and sex of applicants for employment was thus not for any legitimate
purpose of collective bargaining and properly denied by the company. East Dayton
Tool and Die Co., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1502-05 (239 NLRB No. 20) (Murphy, M., dissenting).
166. Unions are similarly requesting information on subjects other than race
and sex data. For example, one Administrative Law Judge found that the employer
violated §§ 8(a)(5) & 8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to supply health-related data to the
union. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Case No. 13-CA-17917 (Decision of Administration
Law Judge Holley, May 1, 1980). The information at issue included the results of
sputum cytology, X-rays, pulmonary function and blood tests administered to unit
employees.
The Administrative Law Judge found that since the employees work with
asbestos, a known hazardous material, the employer must disclose the test results
because safety and health practices are part of the "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" contained in § 8(d) of the NLRA. Id.
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Second, the statistical information requested in Westinghouse
is undoubtedly relevant to the proper performance of the union's
statutory duty of representing unit employees. Such statistics may
often give rise to the inference of unlawful employer
discrimination."6 7 For example, such data may be used to identify
jobs held predominantly by women and therefore may enable the
union to explore whether wage rates for such jobs are lower in com-
parison to other jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility.
Such a pattern would indicate a violation of Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act."6 8 Armed with such information, the union may choose
among a variety of extended collective bargaining strategies. It may
seek to negotiate new contract provisions, or revise existing con-
tracts."9 The IUE has, in fact, long attempted to negotiate improved
job opportunities for women and minorities.7 ' Alternatively, such
data may indicate the effects that purportedly neutral contract pro-
visions, such as seniority, transfer, and testing have upon minorities
and women. Where these practices conflict with contractual EEO
guarantees, such data may provide the basis for the initiation or
processing of a grievance under the existing contract. The union's
entitlement to data extends to information necessary to the proces-
sing of grievances."' Because there is no basis for distinguishing be-
tween grievances based upon substantive contract provisions'72 and
those based on a more general non-discrimination clause,'73 the
employer may be required to disclose all relevant data where EEO
or other provisions are arbitrable.
Furthermore, the specific information demanded by the
union-promotion patterns, job classifications, wage rates, and the
167. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Grossman, Statistical
Proof, 1979 PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW OF THE SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION 205.
168. Section 6(d)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§
201-19. (1976).
169. "The elimination of discrimination and its vestiges is an appropriate sub-
ject of bargaining and an employer may have no objection to incorporating into a col-
lective agreement the substance of his obligation not to discriminate in personnel deci-
sions .. " Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 69 (1975); Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 277, 273 ("... an employer violates
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain in good faith concerning the elimina-
tion of existing or alleged racial discrimination").
170. A.L.J. Decision, supra note 129, at 9.
171. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
172. See, e.g., the substantive provisions detailed at notes 56-81 supra and ac-
companying text.
173. See notes 53-55 supra.
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like - have been traditional subjects of bargaining."' They are not
made less so by a request for information broken down by race and
sex. "'75 Proposals to change wage rates of predominantly female job
classifications fit precisely within a union's collective bargaining
responsibilities. The union has both a statutory'78 and a contractual
duty'77 to make a good faith effort to correct such discrimination. It
has the corollary right to obtain information which will enable it to
determine whether and in what areas to exert its bargaining power.
It likewise has a subsequent responsibility to monitor the adminis-
tration of the collective bargaining agreement so as to secure the
contract's full benefits to its members, and this responsibility is not
suddenly vitiated when the issues at hand involve equal employment
opportunity. The union's only other access to information concerning
enforcement of the agreement or EEO practices of the employer
would be derived from the often episodic or happenstance filing of
individual grievances. But information about individual grievances
does not present the kind of overview necessary to evaluate the im-
plementation of contract terms, particularly, as in Westinghouse,
where the non-discrimination clause is non-arbitrable. In such a
situation, employees are likely to proceed directly to the ad-
ministrative agencies which enforce equal opportunity through the
public sector, bypassing the grievance process altogether. The
Board's finding that the information requested was presumptively
relevant is clearly no more than the literal and necessary application
of long-standing labor law principles to a particular substantive area
of mandatory bargaining.
Finally, if individual requests for information were subject to
demands for proof of their specific relationship to the negotiation or
administration of contracts, the day-to-day operation of the collec-
tive bargaining process would be undermined. Employers would de-
mand such proof and would be entitled to question the validity of
the union response. This would entail additional administrative pro-
ceedings and needless delay. In determining that such data requests
174. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, note 41 supra, requires employers and unions
to bargain collectively with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment." For a discussion of the scope of such bargaining see C. MORRIS, supra
note 109, at ch. 15.
175. "[Elimination of discrimination and its vestiges is an appropriate subject
of bargaining." Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,
420 U.S. at 69.
176. See discussion of the duty of fair representation, note 151 supra.
177. See notes 130-37 supra and accompanying text.
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would be considered presumptively relevant, the Board relied upon
its experience in the area of requests for wage data:
[T]his broad rule is necessary to avoid the disruptive
effect of the endless bickering and jockeying which has
heretofore been characteristic of union demands and em-
ployer reaction to requests by unions for wage and re-
lated information. The unusually large number of cases
coming before the Board involving this issue demon-
strates the disturbing effect upon collective bargaining of
the disagreements which arise as to whether particular
wage information sought by the bargaining agent is suffi-
ciently relevant to particular bargaining issues. I conceive
the proper rule to be that wage and related information
pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit should,
upon request, be made available to the bargaining agent
without regard to its immediate relationship to the negoti-
ation or administration of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment.18
The presumptive relevance standard thus substantially serves the
goal of smooth administration of the NLRA.
The fact that the union might additionally, use the data obtained
for collective bargaining purposes to enforce statutory and contrac-
tual rights before a court does not undermine the conclusion that
the information must be turned over to the union. Where, as in
Westinghouse, arbitration is not available on certain issues, the
union must seek other forums. Moreover, even if discrimination
claims were arbitrable under the Westinghouse-IUE contract, the
union need not choose between traditional collective bargaining
remedies and litigation. The Supreme Court has unequivocally held
that "Title VII was designed to supplement rather than supplant ex-
isting laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination."'79 As a consequence, overlapping remedies and pro-
cedures are common in labor relations. A Title VII action, for exam-
ple, can be brought after an adverse determination of an ar-
178. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1487 (citing Whiten Machine
Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1541 (1954) (Farmer, Chm., concurring)).
179. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974). The sup-
plementary nature of Title VII has been reaffirmed in allied cases involving other
remedies for discriminatory conduct. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975) ("Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against
private discrimination separate from and independent of ... Title VII").
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bitrator"8 ° and the NLRB and arbitrators have concurrent jurisdic-
tion to enforce collective bargaining agreements. 81 The Board has
found that the employer must disclose information where unfair
labor practices may be filed,'82 even if the union is at the same time
seeking information in state court discovery proceedings.'83 As the
Board noted, "[oince the requested information is found to be rele-
vant to the union's representative function, it is not controlling that
such information might also be used for other purposes.""" A union's
pursuit of equal employment through contract revision or the
grievance process may ultimately prove fruitless. Litigation may
then be the only method available to secure change in workplace
rules. A strike or a trade-off of legitimate member demands for
higher wages or other working conditions ought not to be required
of a union seeking conscientiously to implement equal opportunity.'"
Similarly, the union ought not to leave EEO issues to individual
litigation. Individual workers lack the union's broad perspective on
company practices and policies; the disposition of. such matters is of
general importance to all employees in the unit. Litigation by the
union, 8 " then, is a necessary and rightful supplement to collective
bargaining avenues for change. The possibility of such litigation pro-
vides no legitimate defense for a refusal to turn over information
clearly relevant to the bargaining process.
Westinghouse and related cases provide the indispensable pro-
cedural mechanism for unions to police the collective bargaining
agreement effectively and to meet their statutorily imposed duty of
fair representation. Even more significant, these right to informa-
tion cases provide the means for unions to assess the need for, and
the potential success of, affirmative action programs which may go
beyond the minimum requirements of the law. The discovery rights
they accord to unions are the procedural analogues of the affirm-
180. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
181. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
182. NLRB v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 410 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1969) (union
entitled to information from employer to determine whether to file grievance or file
unfair labor practice with the NLRB).
183. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 193 N.L.R.B. 940, 943 (1971).
184. East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1499 n.6 (239 NLRB No. 20).
185. Such tactics would probably so divide the union's membership that the
ultimate success of a strike action would be unlikely, at least where non-minority
group employees comprise the majority of the union's membership.
186. See, e.g., Social Serv. Union, Local 535 v. County of Santa Clara, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 684 (9th Cir. 1979); Local 186, Int'l Pulp & Paper Mill Workers v.
Minnesota Mining Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
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ative action sanctioned by the Weber case.187 As discussed above, Ti-
tle VII does not forbid unions and employers from creating solutions
to longstanding workplace inequities even though the union and the
employer may not be the origin of such inequities.'88 Moreover,
neither the union nor the employer have to admit past violations of
the Act, or even "arguable" violations of the Act, in order to in-
stitute such affirmative action programs.'89 Rather, the statute was
intended to encourage employers and unions to examine and eval-
uate employment practices, permitting them to "endeavor to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges" of discrimination. 9 '
The parties may, within limits, 9' engage in voluntary race-conscious
efforts to abolish "traditional racial patterns of segregation and
hierarchy.""1 ' Without the specific sorts of data discoverable under
Westinghouse, however, the union would be in a poor position to ad-
vocate any such measures. Weber-type plans must be designed to
deal with specific problems, a process which requires rational discus-
sion and a bilateral approach. Since the employer is the only party
with access to such information, unions must be able to secure that
data through the processes of the NLRA. For this reason, the re-
quirement that the employer disclose data is founded on the national
policies underlying Title VII, as well as on the settled interpretation
of the NLRA.
In sum, the Board's disclosure rulings are firmly grounded in
past precedent and draw sustenance from general principles under-
lying our national labor and anti-discrimination policies. They reflect
the adaptation of traditional union rights to an appropriate, if re-
cent, EEO emphasis. By recognizing the importance of the sort of.
data discussed in this section, the NLRB and the courts provide the
practical tools necessary to achieve the permissible and desirable
goals discussed in the preceding section. The availability of such
data is the final necessary component of union activism in EEO
issues. Only by combining the full acceptance of EEO matters as a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining with the availability of
the internal and ongoing grievance and arbitration dispute resolu-
tion process is it possible to create an adequate private alternative
to the litigation forum. But that alternative, once created, would be
187. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
188. Id. at 200-01.
189. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum, 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
190. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
191. Id. at 204; see note 103 supra.
192. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
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hopelessly crippled if the agencies or the courts drew a procedural
line where they refuse to draw a substantive one, that is by singling
out EEO matters for different treatment with respect to the
employer's duty to provide relevant information.
GOOD FAITH EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE EEO SHOULD PROVIDE
INSULATION FROM BACK PAY LIABILITY FOR UNIONS
The preceding section of this article sought to demonstrate
that unions which wish to utilize the collective bargaining process
have the necessary policy and statutory tools with which to do so.
Certainly, the moral rectitude of redressing long-standing economic
and social inequities provides a measure of incentive to unions to
take up those tools and fashion appropriate EEO programs, par-
ticularly in light of labor's traditional concern with ethical and
political issues that often transcend the immediate short-term in-
terests of their members. Nevertheless, there are other, less
altruistic reasons why unions will be well-served by developing an
interest in EEO matters. Not only do these EEO pressures already
exist, but they can be emphasized and increased by aggrieved
female and minority workers, who provide reason to believe that, as
time passes and the desirability and possibility of private EEO pro-
cesses become more evident, those private processes will become
increasingly utilized. This section seeks to detail the recent judicial
and administrative policies which will contribute to that develop-
ment.
Judicial determinations of violation of statutory duties can im-
pose burdensome liability, particularly on financially vulnerable
unions. Such litigation most often focuses on the discriminatory ef-
fects of collective bargaining agreements. The well-established rule
in such cases is that unions which sign such discriminatory collective
bargaining agreements, as well as their employer partners, violate
Title VII,193 and perhaps the duty of fair representation as well.'94
But recent policy initiatives by the EEOC and holdings by the lower
193. See, e.g., Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
See generally Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV.
702, 703-08 (1980).
194. See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (violation of duty of fair representation in contract provisions governing seniority
and transfer); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (sexually-
segregated job classification system violated duty of fair representation). See gener-
ally Note, Making Labor Unions Responsive to Working Women's Needs: Title VII
and the Duty of Fair Representation Compared, 2 HARV. WOMENS LAW J. 141 (1980).
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federal courts establish the principle that good faith efforts to
eliminate discriminatory employment practices should insulate a
union from financial liability. This principle is in accordance with the
policy and the text of Title VII as well as with the general rules of
liability in labor law cases.
New Policy of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
On April 1, 1980, the EEOC adopted a resolution designed to
encourage voluntary affirmative action by unions and employees:
1. Through its administrative processes, the Commission
shall recognize the "good faith" efforts of unions and
employers to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices, whether undertaken in cooperation with
each other or unilaterally; "good faith" must be of a
compelling and aggressive nature evaluated on a case-
by-case basis.
2. When engaged in investigation, conciliation, and en-
forcement, the Commission shall exercise its discre-
tion in recognition of union or employer voluntary af-
firmative action that meets appropriate standards.19
Within the EEOC, this discretionary policy will affect the pro-
cessing of complaints and the decision whether to litigate against a
particular respondent. In a memorandum accompanying the resolu-
tion, EEOC Vice-Chairman Daniel Leach emphasized that the new
strategy is congruent with other recent EEOC initiatives designed
to encourage voluntary compliance with the statute.19 These recent
initiatives include the "bottom line" principle of the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures197 and the protections
195. EEOC, Resolution to Encourage Voluntary Affirmative Action in Collec-
tive Bargaining, [1980] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 103.
196. Memorandum from EEOC Vice-Chairman Daniel Leach to Chairman
Eleanor Homes Norton (March 18, 1980).
197. 43 Fed. Reg. 38290 (1978). The Guidelines, jointly issued by the EEOC, the
Civil Service Commission, the Department of Labor and the Department of Justice set
out uniform principles on the use of tests and other selection procedures. The "bottom
line" principle which they incorporate states that if the
total selection process for a job does not have an adverse impact, the
Federal Enforcement Agency, in the exercise of their prosecutorial discre-
tion, in usual circumstances will not expect a user to evaluate the in-
dividual components for adverse impact, or to validate such individual
components and will not take enforcement action based upon adverse im-
pact of any component of that process ....
Id. at § 4(c). They likewise provide that if the job selection for any race, sex, or ethnic
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provided by EEOC's voluntary Affirmative Action Guidelines.'98
Although the EEOC had previously used its discretionary authority
to evaluate individual union's and employer's conduct in determining
Title VII violations,' the April 1, 1980 resolution was its first
general policy statement regarding collective bargaining issues.
Such general policy guidance helps private parties conform their
behavior to legal expectations.
These new EEOC directions mobilize the prosecutorial discre-
tion inherent in a federal enforcement agency to provide specific
and meaningful incentives for private parties to comply voluntarily
with the law. They are also consistent with the specific role that the
EEOC was established to play. Describing Title VII and the func-
tions of the EEOC, Justice Powell in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 20 noted:
Cooperative and voluntary compliance were selected as the
preferred means for achieving [the elimination of unlawful
employment discrimination]. To this end Congress created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission .... In the
Equal Employment Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103, Congress amended Title VII to provide the Commis-
sion with further authority to investigate individual
targets of discrimination, to promote voluntary com-
pliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to in-
stitute civil actions against employers or unions named in
a discrimination charge.O1
Title VII therefore constitutes strong encouragement to employers
and labor organizations to act voluntarily to modify discriminatory
employment practices and systems without awaiting litigation or
group is greater than 80%, as compared to other applicants, federal enforcement agen-
cies will not generally find "adverse impact" upon the protected group. Id. at § 4(d).
An employer who reforms his selection process will thus not be sued under Title VII
or under Executive Order 11246.
198. 44 Fed. Reg. 4422 (1979). These guidelines provide that when employers
who have reason to believe their practices may be discriminatory take voluntary steps
to change them, the EEOC will not find them in violation of Title VII on grounds of
"reverse discrimination." See also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
199. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 70-112 (Sept. 15, 1969) EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 6108 (union consistently opposing employer's sex discriminatory wage policies
has not violated Title VII even though collective bargaining agreement incorporated
discriminatory provisions).
200. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
201. Id. at 44. Accord, Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 650
(5th Cir. 1974); Airline Stewards and Stewardesses v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d
101, 109 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Hutchings v. United States Indus. Inc., 428 F. Supp.
303 (5th Cir. 1979).
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formal governmental action. The EEOC has stressed that nondis-
crimination and voluntary action are mutually consistent and in-
terdependent methods for ameliorating the social and economic con-
ditions which precipitated the enactment of the Civil Rights Act.2 2
While the details of the EEOC's view of "good faith efforts" to
eliminate discrimination have yet to be developed, these recent ad-
ministrative policies reflect sensitivity to the dynamics of the
bargaining process, to the developing case law in the field, and to
variation among degrees of culpability in EEO matters. Most impor-
tant, they recognize the indispensable role that private parties can
play and the desirability of providing tangible incentives to encour-
age such parties to act.
Judicial Determination of Union Liability for Back
Pay Under EEO Laws
Labor organizations are subject to our national nondiscrimina-
tion policy both under statutory provisions 3  and under the
judicially-created duty of fair representation. 4 A union thus has a
duty to eliminate discriminatory employment practices whether
those practices or their impact are of the union's own design and in-
vention, are created as a result of a collective agreement with an
employer, or are simply the result of passive acquiescence to
202. EEOC Affirmative Action Guidelines, note 198 supra.
203. Sections 703(c) and (d) of Title VII provide:
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
organization -
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex or national orgin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for
membership, or to classify or fail to refuse to refer for employment any
individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as
an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling ap-
prenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in any pro-
gram established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(c) to -2(d) (1976).
204. See note 151 supra.
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employer practices that a reasonably prudent union should have
known about and acted upon. Although statutory liability is imposed
without regard to subjective intent,0 5 the union's aggressiveness, or
lack of it, regarding EEO matters is crucial when remedies, par-
ticularly back pay, are at issue.
Where unions are the dominant or exclusive force behind the
discriminatory practice, issues include discriminatory union hiring
halls'0 and membership rules,0 7 limits on apprenticeship oppor-
tunities, 8 and the like. Also in this category are cases in which
unions use their bargaining leverage to force employers to accept
discriminatory practices upon union initiative.' The applicable legal
principles and the facts at issue in these cases leave no doubt that
such practices clearly violate Title VII.
The second major category of cases concerns union liability for
discriminatory practices which are part of, or perpetuated by, collec-
tive bargaining agreements. This is by far the largest category of
cases. The general rule that has emerged is that a union is liable for
such discriminatory practices even if the contract is facially neutral,
regardless of the union's good faith in negotiating the contract.210
This rule is based on two premises. The first is that unions gener-
ally know the effect that the incorporation or continuation of con-
tract provisions has upon unit employees. "Common sense demands
that a union be held for the natural consequences of its labors of
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement." '' The fact that the
205. See notes 210-18 infra and accompanying text.
206. E.g., United States v. Local 357, IBEW, 356 F. Supp. 104 (D. Nev. 1973)
(union violates Title VII when it operates hiring hall that limits jobs, information, and
membership to whites).
207. E.g., EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1976) (union responsible for discrimination in membership and referral policies);
Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (union's
membership requirements are discriminatory).
208. E.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th
Cir. 1969) (union's failure to publicize that its apprenticeship training is now open to
blacks violates Title VII).
209. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
210. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976)
(both local and international unions liable for seniority provisions that perpetuated ef-
fects of past discrimination); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (seniority system perpetuating past discrimination);
Macklin v. Spector Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chrapliwy v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Stevenson v. International Paper Co.,
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1279 (W.D. La. 1977) (collective bargaining agreement
segregated women into lowest paying jobs and restricted transfers).
211. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1381 (5th Cir.
1974).
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union may not have "intended" such discriminatory effect is of no
moment. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 the Court held that the "in-
tentional" discriminatory practices banned by Title VII are those
which defendants have engaged in deliberately rather than acciden-
tally. 1 ' "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation." ' In areas such
as testing, educational requirements or job classification, practices
and procedures neutral on their face (and even those neutral in
terms of subjective intent) cannot be maintained if they operate to
"freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices." '216 Proof of discriminatory intent is specifically not re-
quired under the "disparate impact" theory of employment discrim-
ination."' The other premise for finding union liability for collective
bargaining provisions is that doing so effectuates the policy of Con-
gress in enacting Title VII. Title VII was enacted to require
employers and unions to examine their practices in an attempt to
end discriminatory practices voluntarily."8 Without such private in-
itiative outside of the courtroom, the aims of the statute might
never be achieved.
The third major category of recent cases holding unions re-
sponsible for EEO matters often overlaps the collective bargaining
situations just discussed. These cases, however, generally concern
union acquiescence in employment practices which are not embodied
in a collective agreement. A number of courts have found that union
"passivity" in the face of clear discriminatory practices may violate
Title VII and the duty of fair representation. Such practices may in-
clude an employer's discriminatory hiring,1 testing,220 or other like
212. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
213. "If the Court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1976) (emphasis added).
214. 401 U.S. at 430.
215. Id. at 432.
216. Id. at 430.
217. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 342, 335-36
n.15 (1977). Intent may be crucial, however, in cases alleging disparate treatment.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
218. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
219. United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (allega-
tions of union acquiescence in discriminatory acts of employer states a claim against
union for breach of duty of fair representation); Hairston v. McLean Trucking, 62
F.R.D. 642 (M.D.N.C.), vacated on other grounds, 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1974) (union
knew of employer's discriminatory hiring action and encouraged such by its own inac-
tion).
220. EEOC v. Detroit Edison, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949 (D. Md. 1977); Dickerson v. United States Steel, 439 F.
19801
Moskowitz: New Opportunities for Unions to Foster Equal Employment Opportuni
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
42 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 15
policies. In McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co.," for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court found the union to have violated Title VII
by not processing a grievance regarding an employer's discharge of
a white employee. Other courts, however, have explicitly refused to
hold a union liable for employer unilateral discrimination, even
though the union had notice of the discriminatory conduct.'
Once a violation of the statute has been established in a Title
VII action, emphasis shifts to the question of remedy. Section 706(g)
provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intention-
ally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlaw-
ful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include,, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, * * * or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate.3
Congress has thus granted courts "broad discretion to fashion
remedies in Title VII cases as the equities of the particular case
compel." 4 The remedies available under § 706(g) include varieties of
injunctive relief, back pay, front pay, constructive seniority, affirma-
tive recruitment programs, costs, and attorney fees.225 Because of
the complexity of Title VII actions, the courts have increasingly
found it necessary to bifurcate Title VII actions, especially class ac-
Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978) (union ac-
quiescence in company's discriminatory testing and assignment policies actionable
under Title VII and § 1981). In the reverse situation, courts have sometimes found
employers liable for union discriminatory conduct. E.g., Commonwealth v. Local 542,
469 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (contractors association liable because of acquiescence
in union discriminatory membership and hiring hall practices); accord, EEOC v. Enter-
prise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
911 (1977) (same).
221. 427 U.S. 273 (1975). Cf. Peterson v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th
Cir. 1972) (union violation of duty of fair representation in failure to process
grievances).
222. Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974). See
generally Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702,
708-24 (1980).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
224. LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5th Cir.
1972).
225. See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
chs. 37-39 (1979).
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tions, into Stage I and Stage II proceedings."6 In Stage I, the plain-
tiff and class representative typically have the burden of showing
that a challenged practice violates applicable law and that individ-
uals of the class have suffered economic loss or damages. Stage II
proceedings determine the appropriate relief to be awarded.' At
this stage liability for back pay is often the most serious question
for a union.
In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 8 the Supreme Court made
clear that federal courts have wide discretion, in exercising their
equitable powers in Title VII actions, to fashion the most complete
relief possible. The Court found that the provisions and objectives of
the act were to achieve equality of employment opportunity and to
"make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination."' Both purposes are served by the
award of back pay to innocent victims. The injured party is placed
in the position he would have been in but for the violation of the
statute. Back pay likewise helps to remove barriers to equality be-
cause it is the reasonably certain prospect of a back pay award that
motivates employers and unions to review their practices and
endeavor to eliminate unlawful barriers.2'
Union duties in the EEO area may be most effectively addressed
in the remedial stage, particularly in the assessment of financial
liability. The law must provide concrete incentives and tangible
rewards for unions to invest their bargaining power in EEO issues.
The courts should explicitly announce a rule that unions that make
good faith efforts to assure equal opportunity will be insulated from
back pay liability.
Such a rule would rest upon three bases. First, it would pro-
vide a tangible incentive for union action regarding EEO, whether
that be to end discriminatory practices or to engage in affirmative
action designed to remedy problems outside the scope of federal
statutes. 3' A union can respond to these problems in a variety of
226. See, e.g., Baxter v. Savannah Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 443 (5th Cir. ),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
227. The basic procedure for order and allocation of proof in Stage II pro-
ceedings is set out in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at
356-77.
228. 422 U.S. 405 (1974).
229. Id. at 418.
230. Id.
231. See notes 98-108 supra and accompanying text.
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significant ways. It can request information from the employer and
examine the effects of the contract on unit employees, propose revi-
sions in the contract, grieve and arbitrate EEO issues where possi-
ble, and even initiate administrative or court actions to remedy
problem areas. 32 If a union will be liable for back pay despite its
best efforts to do away with discriminatory practices, there is little
incentive to engage in the effort.
Secondly, § 706(g)2" of the Act provides that if a court finds
that the respondent has violated the Act, it may enjoin the unlawful
employment practice and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate. Such affirmative action includes reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees "with or without back pay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice) .... '34
Liability for back pay is thus squarely placed on the party "responsi-
ble" for the illegal act. In this textual context, "responsible" must
imply a form of causation for the harm produced. 3 5 In collective
bargaining, a ritualistic assumption that unions have sufficient
economic power to negotiate the elimination of all unlawful practices
is unrealistic. Unions vary in their bargaining strength and in their
commitment to equal employment opportunities. While the wronged
plaintiff must be "made whole," the allocation of back pay between
employer and union should rest upon an assessment of the par-
ticular situation before the court. A union which makes good faith
efforts to eradicate unlawful practices should not be financially
punished because of its lack of success. That failure may stem from
reasons far from the proscriptions of Title VII. Moreover, as an in-
tegral part of equitable relief,"" back pay is subject to the
"Chancellor's conscience" and to fundamental concepts of fairness. 37
A third reason for insulating unions which make good faith ef-
forts to eradicate discriminatory practices is the congruence of this
232. See text accompanying notes 37-192 supra.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. "Responsible" has been defined as "answerable as the primary cause ...
or agent," WEBSTERS 3RD NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1959).
236. See, e.g., EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, Local 638, 542 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1976); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 493 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia
Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir. 1971).
237. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); EEOC v.
Lithographers Local 2P, 412 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1976).
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standard with principles of liability in the related area of the union's
duty of fair representation.23 8 In the latter, unions are typically sued
for breach of their duty and the employer is sued for breach of con-
tract. The union's liability under the NLRA in such a situation was
set out by the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes.2 9
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability be-
tween the employer and the union according to the
damage caused by the fault of each. Thus damages at-
tributable solely to the employer's breach of contract
should not be charged to the union, but increases, if any,
in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process
the grievance should not be charged to the employer.240
The Vaca standard thus assigns liability to each party in direct pro-
portion to the fault of each. A number of courts and commentators
have equated the standards applicable in Title VII with those in fair
representation cases.241 A general principle that union liability for
back pay should be equivalent to its unlawful conduct would be an
appropriate reflection of the clear inter-relationship of these two
substantive areas.
In the recent past, a number of Court of Appeal and District
Courts have rendered decisions in accordance with the views ad-
238. See note 151 supra.
239. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
240. Id. at 197. See also Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1969):
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of any
discriminatory conduct by the union and a subsequent discriminatory
refusal by the union to process grievances based on the discharge,
damages against the union for loss of employment are unrecoverable ex-
cept to the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances added to the
difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer. If both the union
and the employer have independently caused damage to employees, the
union cannot complain if separate actions are brought against it and the
employer for the portion of the total damages caused by each.
Id. at 29. See also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979),
where the Supreme Court, in ruling out punitive damages in DFR cases acknowledged
the collective interest of union members in protecting limited funds and noted that
such awards could impair the financial stability of the union.
241. See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (seniority system violates DFR); Chapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252
(N.D. Ind. 1977) (union acquiescence in employer's discriminatory practices and its
negotiation of bidding and bumping procedures in sex segregated units violated its
duty of fair representation); Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1094
(W.D. Pa. 1971) (DFR violation in signing contract containing separate seniority lists
and lower pay for equal work). See generally 2 HARV. WOMENS L.J. 141, note 193
supra.
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vocated above. These courts look to the specific conduct of the par-
ties in order to assess back pay liability. The union's advocacy of
contract proposals or revisions has been one factor in determining
responsibility for back pay, 42 as has union conduct in processing
grievances based upon discriminatory practices.2 3 Union good
faith has also been demonstrated by vigorous efforts to correct dis-
crimination through administrative proceedings before the EEOC
and through the initiation of litigation. " In a number of instances,
courts have not determined the actual assessment of money liability,
but have stated that such a determination will depend on the union's
specific conduct. 45
The determination of a union's good faith in meeting its respon-
sibilities under the EEO statutes will necessarily vary from situa-
tion to situation. Courts will have to look to the specifics of the prac-
tice involved, the bargaining history, the amount of economic power
wielded by each party and the sincerity of the union's effort. Some
degree of imprecision is inevitable, but the judgment that a court
will have to make does not differ in kind from that which it must
242. See, e.g., Social Serv. Union, Local 535 v. Santa Clara County, 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1979); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, 458 F. Supp. 474
(E.D. Va. 1978).
243. Dickerson v. United States Steel, 472 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (union
has not violated Title VII where it processed grievance attacking the discriminatory
impact of employers tests and opposed them in court); Hairson v. McLean Trucking, 62
F.R.D. 642 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
244. Social Serv. Union, Local 535 v. Santa Clara County, 21 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 684 (9th Cir. 1979).
Presumably the County recognizes that the union could reasonably
believe their vigorous efforts to correct the discrimination prior to suit
through negotiations with the County and administrative proceedings
before EEOC as well as their initiation and pursuit of this suit itself,
would protect them from liability for back pay if the suit succeeded.
Id. at 686.
245. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ryder Truck, 555 F.2d 1181, 1182 (4th Cir. 1977)
(union not liable for back pay because it initiated the "only" efforts directed at com-
pliance with Title VII); United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d
336, 342 (4th Cir. 1974) ("whether either or both of the unions is to share in N & W's
liability for back pay depends on whether they combined with N & W to deprive black
employees of income opportunities"); EEOC v. Detroit Edison, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec.
8583 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (employer to be assessed back pay unless union responsible for
particular act or practice); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 14 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1279 (W.D. La. 1977) ("If the unions discharged their duties of fair and equal
representation, they will recover their share of back pay claims from the Company").
See also Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974) (where
union rather than employer bore primary responsibility for discriminatory act, it bears
full financial liability).
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make in any other situation.""6 The court, and the EEOC, will look to
the particular union's behavior and at the intent manifested by that
behavior.2"7 Some of the guidelines for this inquiry will undoubtedly
emerge from the type of union activity described earlier in this arti-
cle.
In short, the allocation of back pay liability should be consis-
tent with the text of Title VII, the underlying policies of the Act,
and doctrine in kindred areas of labor law. It should reflect the ac-
tual course of behavior of the parties. Where the union has acted in
good faith to eliminate discriminatory practices or to implement af-
firmative action, according the union insulation from back pay liabil-
ity satisfies each of these considerations.
246. The determination made by both the NLRB and the courts in judging
whether the parties have bargained in "good faith" under § 8(a)(5) is no more difficult
or subjective than that which the EEOC and the courts will be called upon to make in
determining responsibility for back pay. The Board and the courts have struggled to
define this duty to bargain in good faith over the years. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mont-
gomery Ward Co., 133 F.2d 676, 636 (9th Cir. 1943) ("a present intention to find a basis
for agreement, . . . an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement").
Although certain behavior is a "per se" violation of this duty, see, e.g., NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736 (1962), generally the decision is made based on the totality of the conduct.
NLRB v. Stevenson Brick & Block Co., 393 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1968). See generally C.
MORRIS, supra note 109, ch. 11.
247. See text accompanying notes 37-192 supra. The ability of the courts to im-
plement such a rule may depend on other substantive and procedural issues. Often one
party to a collective bargaining agreement who is sued will cross-claim or counter-
claim against the other. This action then requires a determination of the right of one
party to secure contribution from the other. Despite the fact that no right of contribu-
tion is mentioned in Title VII, two recent appellate court decisions, Glus v. G.C. Mur-
phy Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 86 (3d Cir. 1980) and Northwest Airlines v. T.W.U.,
20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 976 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, __ U.S. - , 100 S. Ct.
1077 (1980), have found that there is such a federal common law right to contribution
for back pay awarded under Title VII. A number of district courts have likewise found
a federal common law right of contribution for back pay in Title VII actions. Grogg v.
General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523, (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62
F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Osborne v. McCall Printing Co., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 276 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Blanton
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49 F.R.D. 162, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 602 (N.D. Ga.
1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544
F.2d 837, 860 (5th Cir. 1977); Electrical Workers (IUE) v. Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., Inc., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,273 (W.D. N.Y. 1976). Contra, Younger v. Glomorgan
Paper & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743 (W.D. Va. 1967). Such a right of contribution
effectuates the policies of Title VII because it leads to a more equitable distribution of
loss between the defendants, lessens the possibility of collusion between plaintiff and
potential defendants, and generally serves to deter violations of Title VII. See North-
west Airlines v. Transportation Workers Union, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 969 (D.D.C.
1977).
19801
Moskowitz: New Opportunities for Unions to Foster Equal Employment Opportuni
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
48 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol.15
CONCLUSION
The need to deal with historic inequities in the treatment of
minority and female workers is as great today as in 1964 when Title
VII was enacted. These inequities can be addressed in a variety of
ways. The choice of means will necessarily reflect the exigencies of
each specific situation.
Collective bargaining is fundamentally a democratic process in
which the parties themselves face and resolve problems in the work-
place. As the earlier portions of this article have demonstrated,
unions today have numerous opportunities to advance equal oppor-
tunity through this process. The remedial potential of collective
bargaining in many instances will equal or surpass that of litigation.
This is particularly true in the aftermath of the Weber case, which
validated the use of private collective bargaining to implement af-
firmative action.
But the potential of collective bargaining will not be realized
unless unions act aggressively in EEO matters. The union's behavior
can and should be influenced by the law. Recent administrative and
judicial developments have begun to provide tangible incentives for
union activity in this field. Just as important in determining union
response, however, will be the conduct of minority and female union
members. These members must employ available pressure points
within their labor organizations to force EEO issues to the forefront
of union concerns in contract negotiation, administration and other
activities. The institutional power of unions can be the decisive fac-
tor in achieving true equality of opportunity for minorities and
women.
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